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The objective of the current ingando is to allow 
participants, soldiers or civilians. to go beyond 
,the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and 
speak freely about. the conflict which opposes 
:them. to heal the wounds, to accept responsi-
bilities in case harm was done. to demystifY the 
negative perceptions of one towards the other, 
to assume collectively the consequences of the 
common tragedy and agree on the common 
future. Ingando is based on the approach of 
problem resolution, which encourages the 
participants to analyze their conflict. its causes, 
and attitudes of one towards the other and 
post-conflict relationships. 
Within the framework of military integration, 
this methodology comprises four phases. The 
first phase allows RDF soldiers and ex-combat-
ants to speak out about history and origin of 
the conflict. with the aim of removing barriers 
which prevented them from communicating. 
The second phase consists of appointing the 
former opponents to various posts. By working 
together they continue their discussions about 
the conflict and establish close relations. 
During the third stage, participants are 
encouraged to analyze the conflict as a common 
problem with shared losses and responsibili-
ties. This is done not to utter blames but to 
analyze the conflict so as to prevent it from 
occurring again in future. During the fourth 
stage. ex-combatants appraise all the process. 
Ingando is the beginning of the resolution of the 
conflict. The challenge is to always b capable of 
ensuring an atmosphere which allows mutual 
respect, recognition of dignity and humanity of 
each participant. 
Between 1995 and 2002. 49.700 
ex-combatants were integrated into RDF. while 
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the latter was demobilizing 27.340 soldiers 
This process has continued up to date. The 
country has received dividends from the 
security climate as a result of this policy of 
military integration. It has allowed to efficiently 
fight against uprising of infiltrated elements by 
cutting ex-RAF and militias from their supply 
base, since integrated soldiers had become 
citizens who wanted to protect their families. 
Besides. these soldiers, once demobilized. 
transformed themselves into actors of 
economic development and reconciliation. 
Military integration is an important element in 
the process of reconciliation and restoration of 
sustainable peace. The success depends on the 
political and military leadership will, on its 
insertion at grassroots level and its ownership 
by communities. International partners will 
back up local initiatives but the latter do not 
belong to them. Finally, in the perspective of 
reconciliation. ex-combatants should also be 
considered as "victims" of the conflict and 
consequently losers as well. 
The experience of military integration carried 
out by RDF produced a new example of an inte-
grated institution. It has allowed also to ensure 
security in _ the country and to propose a new 
model of the culture of unity and hope as 
opposed to the culture of hatred and despair. 
************* 
The demobilization process in Burundi, 
by Col. Isate NIYIBIZI 
A historical reminder of the major events which 
occurred before this process is necessary to 
understand the national program for demobi-
lization and reintegration (PNRR) in Burundi. 
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The victory of the · Front for Democracy. in 
Burundi (FRODEBU) during the elections held 
in June 1933 was followed by the assassination 
of the elected President M. Ndadaye. That act 
was at the origin of the creation, early 1994, of 
the National Council for the Defense of 
Democracy (CNDD) and the Forces for the 
Defense of Democracy (FDD). The launching of 
demobilization operations started on 1st 
December 2004 after the Global Accord of 
Cease-fire which was signed between CNDD-
FDD and the transitional government on 16 
Novembei· 2003. 
Demobilization concerned both the Burundian 
Army Forces (FAB) and the combatants from 
Parties and armed political Movements. The cri-
teria which were considered were: voluntary 
service, physical condition, age, discipline, edu-
cation level, cost of defense and security corps. 
An organ in charge of socio-professional reinte-
gration of the demobilized had to be set up. And 
each demobilized person had to receive a demo-
bilization allowance. In total, 80,000 persons 
from the target groups were concerned plus 
20,000 gardiens de la paix and 10,000 activist 
combatants. But. in reality, the total number of 
persons to be demobilized amounted to about 
55.000. 
The fund had to be provided, in order of impor-
tance, by the Fiduciary Fund MDRP (1st donor) 
or the program for demobilization and reinte-
gration of ex-combatants from seven countries 
of the Great Lakes region (Angola, Burundi, 
Uganda, CAR, DRC. Congo, Rwanda), the World 
Bank and Germany. The total cost was estimat-
ed at US$ 84,4 millions : the average cost per 
beneficiary being 1,325 US$. 
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The process had to go through different phases: 
confinement, checking, registration, question-
naire on expectations, orientation before the 
departure, medical screening, voluntary 
screening for HIV I AIDS, distribution of depar-
ture package (9-month salary, the remaining 9 
months to be paid in 3 installments after an 
interval of 3 months) and transport expenses to 
the provinces of destination. 
The guiding principles of reintegration are as 
follows : the adult demobilized receive the 
same level of assistance (about US$600) sup-
plied in kind. each ex-combatant chooses 
him/herself his/her location for reintegration 
and his/her activity. PNDRR provides special 
assistance for ex-child soldiers and handi-
capped ex-combatants. The programme fore-
sees projects of general interest for resettlement 
communities. Five options were suggested: 
vocational training, formal education, income-
generating activities. entrepreneurship and 
employment promotion. 
In May 2007. the total number of the demobi-
lized amounted to 20,929 (out of 55,000 expect-
ed). The biggest number of them comes from 
FAB (7.347). CNDD-FDD (7.050) and the 
National Defense Forces (2.859). The gaps 
could be explained by three factors: the figures 
inflated by negotiating parties, on-going 
recruitment by some armed movements during 
the cantonment period and the difficulties of 
reintegration (income-generating activities 
being the only ones to offer real opportunities to 
the demobilized). 
Returning to civilian life for tens of thousands 
of combatants and militia men has undeniably 
improved security in the country. Displaced 
persons and refugees have progressively 
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returned home. And the demobilized constitute, 
even though they are ill-prepared for that. a 
labour force which cannot be neglec ted . 
However, the delay in effective implementation 
of the cease-fire signed be tween the government 
and Rwasa's FNL constitutes a real danger. 
The process of d emobilization is still going on. 
It · is the reason why it is difficult to appreciate 
all its results. However. the tendency shows 
clen rly that economic objectives will not be 
achieved in short or mid-term. On the other 
h<mcl. objectives wh ich had not been identified 
during the conception of the program but which 
are vital for the reconciliation of Burundians 
havt' been attained: demobilization has a llowed 
integra tion of the armed political Movements 
and the Burundian Armed forces into the 
National Defense Forces. Let us not forget that 
it is exclusion or its perception which ran -
sacked and pillaged this country for a lmost h<1lf 
a century. 
********************* 
THEME IV: ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL 
PROCESSES 
Elections et challenges to the 
Democratization process in Tanzania. The 
interface between administrative reforms 
and democratization, by Jonas Ewald 
Tanzania is an interesting example of conflict 
resolution in the Great Lakes region because it 
has developed a polit ical culture of peaceful 
development. in a context of great poverty. 
Tanzania has a strong identity and nationa l 
cohesion: it is also a mong the countries which 
are registering the best performances at the 
level of the African continent in the areas of 
governance. reforms in economic and public 
sectors. 
As regards elections, the country has known a 
long experience of elections which were wt> ll 
conducted within the framework of a single 
party system as well as in the multiparty sys-
tem. Parliamentary and presidential elections 
have been taking place since 1992. The quality 
of these elections improved at every tenn. 
excE'pt in Zanzibar. For the observers. those of 
2002 were free but not fair: in 2005 they were 
free and fair. From the changes that occurred. 
one could mention the number of voters which 
kept increasing (8.93 million in 1995. 10.09 
million in 2000 and 16,42 million in 2005). 
what is a sign of a greater awareness for the 
political participation on the part of the 
population. 
Since 1995, the party in power, Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) has won elections with an 
ever more comfortable lead over the opposition · 
(61,8 % in 1995 . 71,7 % in 2000 and 80,3 % in 
2005). In 1995. the opposition had 46 seats: 
this number dropped to 26 in 2005. whose 19 
were from Zanzibar islands and especially 
Pemba. 
The challenges faced by the process of 
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